2024 Best Ball Review

The good, the bad, and the ugly

2024 was a tough year for me in best ball, as I didn’t advance any of my teams to the finals, and fell just short of significant cashes in the cumulative-style tournaments. This, naturally, led to a below expectation result, which is the first time I’ve finished below expectation since I first started playing best ball back in 2017. Was this bad luck? Variance? Or did I simply play poorly this season? The answer is probably some combination of the three. Below, I’ll review my 2024 strategy, my Five Core Bets and other takes I had to get a better feel for how I played, and what takeaways I can find to improve my play for 2025. I hope you’ll find it useful for your play as well.

Macro Strategy Review

My macro strategy was similar to what I’ve used the last few years, and is primarily geared around taking down one of the gauntlet-type contests found on Underdog and Draftkings, where you essentially have to advance/win in three straight mostly uncorrelated weeks. This format is primed for massive variance in those weeks, but that’s the price of playing for massive prizes, and for playing on the site with the best user draft experience. Secondarily, I play a much lesser amount of cumulative points-style tournaments (~10% of my total), with most of those split between Underdog and Drafters. Overall, there’s slight differences between my strategy for each, as the market usually does a pretty good job of adjusting for the main differences (0.5PPR vs 1PPR, rookies slightly less valuable in cumulative scoring, QBs slightly less valuable on full PPR, etc). But my baseline strategy often remains the same¹, and is composed of these few tenets:

• Diversify portfolio naturally (take ADP discounts when useful)

• Antifragile or hyperfragile teams (avoid middling)

• Draft rookies and second-year players aggressively (aka embrace uncertainty)

• Find the greatest chance for playoff spike weeks at TEs (as it’s a key for success)

• Stack QBs with pass-catchers/teammates (weekly ceiling + season-long correlation)

• Game stack in weeks 17 and 16 (correlation for ceiling outcomes)

In most of these, I feel like I executed my strategy well. I diversified well, selecting only two players on more than 25% of teams (Josh Downs and Nico Collins). I avoided middling teams, with the vast majority of my teams falling as Zero, Hero, or hyperfragile RB teams. I took aggressive stands on rookies, especially in the mid-to-late rounds. I drafted the elite TEs at roughly at 85% clip, and some of my most-drafted late-round tight end were Hunter Henry, Jonnu Smith, and the Packers second-year guys (Musgrave and Kraft), each of whom I identified as having upside in the later rounds last summer. I stacked at a high rate, but didn’t force it ahead of ADP, and I game stacked regularly. In short, I think I executed my macro strategy well. Yet, my results were poor.

Why? Let’s look at some of my more specific bets to see what happened.

Micro Strategy Review

Last summer, I wrote a Five Core Bets article that I followed through on, drafting as I intended. Those core bets were as follows:

1. Elite TEs

2. Nico Collins and the Texans

3. The Adjacent Maye (and Drake Maye himself)

4. Josh Downs

5. Late round rookies

As to be expected, my bets finished with an extremely wide range of outcomes. Starting from the top:

Elite TE (self score = process 8/10, outcome 7/10)

I’m sure I’ll write a full article on this later this spring, but I thought elite TE was a clear process win, with decent results that simultaneously demonstrated why the strategy is so effective and why it can be so frustrating/volatile. On the negative side, Sam Laporta, Kyle Pitts, and Dalton Kincaid all were mediocre assets for much of the year. Each flashed at various points, but couldn’t find the consistent production necessary to pay off their ADPs, and didn’t generate the TE playoff spike week that is so valuable.

In the neutral category are Trey McBride and Travis Kelce, as both had very good years, combining for 20 receptions and 1,900 yards. However, their failure to score touchdowns (5 total) ultimately limited their impact to advance rates. Luckily, touchdown regression did hit in championship week, with Kelce scoring 18.4 points and McBride scoring 24.3 (and leading one team to a second-place Best Ball Mania finish).

Also in the neutral category, but opposite their path, was Mark Andrews. Andrews again displayed per route dominance, finishing with the highest ESPN Open Score, but who’s playing time was limited for unknown reasons (last years’ injury, the preseason car crash, or simply Isaiah Likely being good enough to steal some reps).² Andrews was also a touchdown monster, finishing with a 55-673-11 season that simultaneously showed just how massive his season could have been with his usual volume, and how ultimately how muted it was without that volume. Andrews playoff stretch of three straight performances with a touchdown but no more than four receptions or 68 yards encapsulates this frustrating dichotomy perfectly.

Finally, in the positive column was the infamous “elite tight end who doesn’t count as an elite tight end because he’s being drafted too late”, George Kittle. Kittle’s price stood out to everyone all offseason, simply because the best tight end in football shouldn’t be drafted as a non-elite option. Kittle showed exactly why that price was ridiculous, dropping a 76-1,079, 8 line that included two 100-yard games in week 16 and 17 that helped lead a team to a Best Ball Mania win and $1.5 million. For those counting at home, that’s now three of the last four seasons where the Best Ball Mania winner had had an elite tight end, including George Kittle twice, and why elite tight end is such a good strategy.³

Given my three highest drafted tight ends were Kittle, McBride, and Andrews, I feel good about the decision to target the elite tight ends. And for the others, I correctly identified some concerns with them, and reduced my exposure to them while still making the directional bet. While that didn’t work out this time, I don’t think it was a huge mistake, and I’m happy with both the overall process and outcome.

Nico Collins and the Texans (process 4/10, outcome 2/10)

For those of you that followed read my weekly The Sketch article, you’ll be familiar with my frustration about the Texans this year. I’m sure many others could (and will) break down exactly what went wrong this year, but I’ll do my best here.

Based on what I saw, the Texans failed because: Stefon Diggs missed most of the year to injury, Nico Collins missed nearly half of the year, the Texans offensive line was an abomination, C.J. Stroud missed a slew of passes he normally hits, Tank Dell wasn’t quite the same player this year coming off of injury, the run game wasn’t consistently effective, the coaching was extremely suboptimal, and the Texans go-to playaction plays that targeted the middle of the field were much worse this year than last.

In short, just about everything that could have gone wrong, went wrong.

That said, the Nico Collins bet was almost certainly correct process-wise, and I like my approach of targeting a stacked Stroud after ADP a lot, even with the benefit of hindsight. However, I did note some minor concerns with the coaching staff before the season, and whether they would truly embrace an offense catered to Stroud. I also largely ignored some minor negatives about Stroud’s impending dropped interception regression and straight dropback passing grade as a rookie. Each of those did negatively impact Stroud and the Texans performance this year, and serves as a reminder to better state those assumptions up front, and to recognize/factor in small negatives.

Ultimately, I don’t hate the strong bet I made on the Texans (and there are a lot of outcomes this year where I think it turns out meaningfully better), but we should always be careful of assuming strong improvement when the market is already making that bet. Given my strong target stance on Burrow and the Bengals, it’s hard not to think my exposures of those two teams should have been flipped given the preseason ADPs of each of those offenses. On one hand, we knew the Bengals were talented, and we expected them to be pass-heavy, with a weaker defense. On the other, we assumed Stroud and the Texans would take a leap forward in both talent and volume. Upon review, it’s clear that the “correct” bet would’ve been the Bengals as my primary team, with the Texans as strong secondarily-owned team.⁴

The Adjacent Maye/Maye himself (process 6/10, outcome 4/10)

Meh. That’s how I mostly feel about the Maye/Adjacent Maye bet. When he started Maye, showed exactly what we thought he could be, elevating his teammates and scoring well himself. However, his teammates had pretty mixed outcomes, as his rushing/heliocentric style never made it as clean of a bet as Stroud’s rookie season.

I do still think Maye and the Patriots were underpriced relative their upside, but the market accurately captured concerns with when Maye would start and the relative lack of talent he had at receiver, particularly with Javon Baker and Ja’lynn Polk. Polk in particularly is bet I simultaneously felt compelled to make (rookie WR with good draft capital who was productive in college tied to a QB prospect I really like in round 12-14), and one that I had some doubts on (not a great prospect, probably needed to play as a big slot to maximize productivity, but the slot role was already occupied). Ultimately, I oh-so-often had the choice of Josh Downs or Ja’lynn Polk in round 12, and while I drafted ~25% of Downs and only ~15% of Polk, I *knew* which one was the far more talented player, even if I recognized the potential high-end outcomes for Polk. In retrospect, drafting Downs there and taking Hunter Henry and/or Demario Douglas later was the option I should have done much more of when using the Adjacent Maye strategy. Ultimately this strategy didn’t make-or-break my season, but these type of neutral/small loss results do negatively impact advance rates, so we obviously want to improve here as well.

Josh Downs (process 8/10, outcome 6/10)

2018 Madison drafting in 12-person contests with no playoff gauntlet would’ve roasted the hell out of 2023 Madison for not standing on his player take. And in this specific case, 2018 Madison has a pretty good point. Josh Downs being #good has probably been the strongest player take I’ve had the last 1.5 seasons. And I did follow through on it, drafting about 25% of him. However, I let some concerns over volume and quality of targets from Anthony Richardson (which is/was valid) lead me to diversify a bit, as I’m usually willing to go to ~30% of a player I really like.

Even with the injury and the concerns over his supporting environment, in the future I think I’ll be more willing to make the simple bet on talent when the ADP is this cheap, like it was with Downs here. Not to knock on Ja’Lynn Polk again, but should concerns about the offense really matter when you’re comparing a player that you are almost certain is good and an a good-not-great rookie prospect tied to Jacoby Brissett/rookie QB? Simply put, I wish I had a bit more Downs this year, even if I’m largely happy with both my process and the outcomes.

Late-round rookies (process 7/10, outcome 7/10)

I won’t spend a lot of time on this one, as it seems like such a simple bet. In short, drafting late-round rookies is a wide range of outcome bet that requires us to embrace uncertainty and volatility. I will almost always want to directionally bet on this, as I’m not confident in my ability to predict that Ray Davis, Bucky Irving, or Braelon Allen will have the better season. While Bucky looks like the clear choice now, both Davis and Allen flashed this year, and with long-term injuries to James Cook or Breece Hall, we easily could’ve seen strong production from them as well. So, no real lesson here, other than to keep making this bet, and accept the volatility that comes with it.

Secondary bets (process 6/10, outcome 5/10)

1. Soft fade these early RBs: Derrick Henry, Saquon Barkley, Travis Etienne, Isiah Pacheco, Josh Jacobs (2, 3)

2. Target Breece Hall and Bijan Robinson for legendary upside (7, 5)

3. Draft Rashee Rice heavily in the pre-draft contests (locking in the relative price discount) (10, 2)

4. Target the Bengals, Ravens, and Eagles, and Cardinals passing games (7, 5)

5. Soft fade the Lions, Cowboys, and Packers (4, 5)

I won’t review all of these, but to address the albatross in the room, it’s inarguable that (even soft) fading Saquon Barkley and Derrick Henry was wrong. In this case, the simple “good player goes to better team equals better production” was correct. Have Henry and Barkely run hot? Absolutely. Am I happy that I didn’t go full zero RB bro ideology and complete fade both? Yes (and take that 2018 Madison). But ultimately I think the lesson here is to always be cautious when predicting how good a running back is, as so much of their production is determined by their surroundings.

As far as the other bets, I loved my Rashee Rice strategy. I drafted 20% of him in the pre-NFL draft tournaments at bargain bin prices and in another world, Rice stays healthy and I take one of those tournaments down when paired with my strong Bengals, Bowers, and Downs stances on those teams. Alas, it didn’t happen in this world.

I also have no regrets over my Breece and Bijan focus. Bijan smashed this year, and Breece still flashed a penchant for big plays. I think each still is a decent bet for a legendary season in the future, and my willingness to take a shot at it this year speaks to my growth as a player to not just hammer the one strategy I think is the best, but to be willing to take shots using multiple good strategies.

Final Thoughts on 2024

In summary, my average self-score for my five core and five secondary bets was about 6/10, and my outcome was about 5/10.

I don’t think I played poorly, though I did make some clear mistakes, such as targeting the Texans (especially over the Bengals), and fading Saquon and Derrick Henry. I also do think I got a little more unluckier than the average player (of course), as injuries to Rashee Rice, Nico Collins, and Josh Downs were difficult, as were McBride’s lack of touchdowns and Andrews loss of playing time/volume.

Ultimately, while it was my worst year of best ball so far, I never fault particularly upset about it. Throughout the season, I think I did a good job of remaining in scientist mode for the most part, even when the breaks weren’t going my way, or I knew I made a clear mistake. In short, even if 2018 Madison was annoyed I wasn’t betting as strongly as possible on my strongest convictions, I think he would acknowledge that I’m a better player now then I was then.

Here’s to a few weeks/months off before diving in to best ball in 2025. If past precedent is any indication, the prospect bros have already been grinding to find the next Sam Laporta. But for me, I plan to enjoy the playoffs, and hope that this time is finally THE time for the Vikings. Hope your 2024 season was better than mine, and I hope you’ll be ready for more best ball content from me in 2025.

Happy new year, and as always, thanks for reading!

1. I will note that I’m much more aggressive on taking stands on Drafters. In a cumulative scoring + PPR environment, there is no playoff week variance to balance out player outcomes. It’s a make-or-miss tournament (which is it’s own form of variance), and you are going to need #TheGuys to win it. This year, my three biggest stands on Drafters were Brock Bowers, Josh Downs, and Nico Collins. So, injuries to Downs and Collins meant I simply wasn’t going to win the tournament on the teams where I had those guys, even if I feel like I absolutely nailed the process of drafting them at at a high clip (~25% for each).

2. Kudos to Ben Gretch here, who was one of the few analysts who was talking about a more limited role for Andrews as possibility, based on his TPPR falling over the last couple seasons. I don’t think Ben nailed it exactly, as Andrews is clearly still very good, but with Likely’s strong 2023, Andrews slight drop-off, and Andrews’ recent injuries, there were more neutral/negative outcomes than what Andrews’ ADP implied.

3. The only year without an elite tight end on the winning team was 2023, with Sam Laporta, who scored 25 points in week 15.

4. One thing that is hard for me to weight in this analysis is the potential week 17 game stack of Ravens-Texans. I loved the Ravens, especially Mark Andrews, and the Texans WR double stack plus Andrews plus Stroud after ADP combination hit on so much of my core strategy, that it probably blinded me to some valid concerns about the Texans. Meanwhile, I didn’t love almost any of the Bengals week 17 game stacking opponent players (the Broncos), who also projected to have one of the best defenses in the league this year (and do, it just didn’t matter). Ultimately, I think it’s a good reminder about where week 17 should fall in our priorities. Yes, it’s extremely important. But if concern over a week 17 opponent is (partially) driving us to stack a more expensive offense without as high as floor as another cheaper offense, some red flags should go up in our minds.